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— Note —
The Political Duopoly:
Antitrust Applicability to
Political Parties and the
Commission on Presidential
Debates
“[S]ooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able
or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to
the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public liberty.”1
“The League of Women Voters is withdrawing its sponsorship of
the presidential debate scheduled for mid-October because the
demands of the two campaign organizations would perpetrate
fraud on the American voter.”2

Abstract
The Commission on Presidential Debates (CPD) has created a
catch-22 for third-party candidates. To be eligible for its debates, the
CPD requires candidates to show a 15% level of national support. But
third-party candidates cannot reach this threshold without first
participating in the CPD’s debates. As a result, the 15% requirement
deprives third-party candidates of a meaningful opportunity to
compete against their major-party opponents.
In 2012, third-party candidate Gary Johnson sued the CPD under
the theory that its selection criteria violate antitrust laws. This Note
explores the viability of this novel legal theory. Although the Supreme
Court has usually barred antitrust application within the political
arena, Johnson’s claim is distinguishable and possibly meets the
elements of a section 1 violation of the Sherman Act. Further, this
Note discusses the public-policy benefits of third-party inclusion and
considers less restrictive, alternative criteria that would still satisfy
the proffered justifications of the 15% requirement.

1.

George Washington, The Address of General Washington to the People
of the United States on his Declining of the Presidency of the United
States (Sept. 19, 1796).

2.

Press Release, League of Women Voters, League Refuses to “Help
Perpetrate a Fraud” (Oct. 3, 1988), [hereinafter League], available at
http://www.lwv.org/press-releases/league-refuses-help-perpetrate-fraud.
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Introduction
Just two days before the 2012 election, the U.S. presidential
candidates decided to hold another debate. Unlike the previous
debates, the candidates sparred at length over the contentious issues
of reforming immigration, fixing campaign finance, and combatting
climate change. But also unlike the previous debates, millions of
voters were not watching. It took place in the back of a coffeehouse.3

3.

Annie Lowrey, Another Presidential Debate, But This Time the
Candidates Are Much Less Familiar, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 2012, at A12.
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Gary Johnson, Jill Stein, Virgil Goode, and Rocky Anderson—all
third-party candidates—held this last minute debate to highlight
some issues of widespread interest that were largely avoided in the
major-party debates.4 Historically, a key value of third-party
candidates has been to popularize issues of voter concern that would
otherwise be ignored by the major parties.5 However, these thirdparty candidates do not run solely for such altruistic purposes. They
want to win. And in today’s political landscape, participation in the
debates sponsored by the Commission on Presidential Debates (CPD)
would be essential to a third-party victory.6
But third-party candidates are essentially excluded from this
opportunity. The CPD restricts its invitations to candidates who are
(1) constitutionally eligible, (2) on enough state ballots to possess a
theoretical chance of winning the Electoral College, and (3) able to
show at least a 15% level of support in national public opinion polls.7
This last requirement has created a catch-22 for third-party
candidates. In order to access the debates, the candidate must first
gain popularity; but in order to gain popularity, the candidate must
first establish viability by participating in the debates.8
Realizing this dilemma, third-party candidates seek relief through
the courts every election season. The plaintiffs have sued the CPD
and previous staging organizations for inclusion in the debates under
an array of legal theories. Despite this persistence, no third party has
successfully sued for inclusion; more often than not, courts have been
bound by deference to agency interpretations.9 Possibly in an attempt
to avoid this, Libertarian candidate Gary Johnson sued the CPD
under a new theory, novel in its application in this field: antitrust
law.10
4.

Press Release, Ralph Nader to Host Third-Party Presidential Debate in
D.C. Nov. 4 (Nov. 1, 2012), available at http://nader.org/2012/11/01/
ralph-nader-to-host-third-party-presidential-debate-in-d-c-114/.

5.

Steven J. Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America 221
(2d ed. 1996).

6.

See Theresa Amato, Grand Illusion 224–25 (2009) (noting that
the debates are essential to candidate viability and that the publicity
benefits from participation are irreplaceable).

7.

See 2012 Candidate Selection Criteria, Commission on Presidential
Debates, http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=candidate-selectionprocess [hereinafter 2012 Criteria].

8.

Ted G. Jelen, The Perot Campaigns in Theoretical Perspective, in Ross
for Boss 1, 4 (Ted G. Jelen ed., 2001).

9.

See, e.g., Buchanan v. FEC, 112 F. Supp. 2d 58, 74 (D.D.C. 2000)
(noting the “substantial deference” the court had to give an FEC
interpretation of its own regulation).

10.

Complaint, Johnson v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 8:2012cv01600
(filed Sept. 21, 2012).
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This Note explores whether antitrust law can or should be applied
to the CPD and its 15% polling requirement for participation. Part I
provides a background on the initial legal hurdles involved in allowing
political debates to even be broadcast. Part I also discusses the
history and origins of the staging organizations, the selection criteria
used by staging organizations, and the claims brought by third-party
candidates challenging the selection criteria.
Part II identifies two obstacles third-party candidates would face
suing under antitrust law and advances a possible distinction between
a third-party candidate’s suit and the “political activity” exemption.
While recognizing counter arguments, Part III attempts to
demonstrate that the CPD’s exclusion of third-party candidates could
possibly violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.11 It discusses the
challenges presented with applying the Act—notably that the novel
theory, without direct precedent, stands on imperfect analogies.
Part III also attempts to distinguish Sheppard v. Lee,12 which
addressed a similar issue. Lastly, this Part suggests a number of
alternatives to the 15% requirement. These alternate standards
represent possible compromises that would make access to this
essential resource reasonable and feasible while adhering to the
proffered justifications for exclusionary rules.
Part IV argues that if a court finds it could apply antitrust within
its discretion, the court should apply this law. It explains how public
policy would benefit from third-party inclusion and how this would
align with the broader purposes of antitrust law. While the debates
are a part of the political process, they are also the manifestation of a
competitive enterprise. And the Sherman Act’s goal of maintaining a
level playing field in competitive arenas compels a more lenient policy
of access to the debates.

I.

Background of Televised Debates

A.

Development and Issues of Broadcast Debates

Political debates have long been subject to controversy and
criticism. The initial legal issues involved the ability to broadcast a
debate.13 When the Communications Act of 193414 was enacted,
11.

Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).

12.

929 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1991).

13.

Newton N. Minow & Craig L. LaMay, Inside the Presidential
Debates: Their Improbable Past and Promising Future 29
(2008). It should be noted that Newton N. Minow is a former chairman
of the Federal Communications Commission, and is currently Vice
Chairman of the Commission on Presidential Debates. Id. at ix–x.

14.

Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C. (2006)).

242

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 1·2013
The Political Duopoly

section 315 regulated public office candidates’ use of a broadcasting
station.15 This section came to be known as the “equal opportunity”
or “equal time” rule.16 This rule stated that any broadcaster giving or
selling airtime to one candidate in any political race must provide the
same opportunity to all other “legally qualified candidate[s]” running
for the same office.17
The equal time rule mirrored section 18 of its predecessor, the
1927 Radio Act.18 In passing the Radio Act, legislators hoped
providing political candidates with equal access to broadcast time
would prevent manipulation of the airwaves. This fear of propaganda
worried Congress because “American thought and American politics
will be largely at the mercy of those who operate these stations.”19
Yet approval of an equal opportunity rule was not universal; the
possible consequences of such a requirement created some
apprehension on the congressional debate floor. One U.S. senator
feared such a regulatory scheme would lead to a situation where
anyone “desir[ing] to deliver a lecture on bolshevism or
communism . . . would be entitled to do so.”20 However, none of these
concerns came to fruition with the Communications Act until the
advent of television.21
Candidates viewed this new medium as an essential feature to a
successful campaign strategy, which led to a growing concern about
the distribution of its access. The first major amendment to the
Communications Act occurred in 1959, following the events of a
Chicago mayoral election. During that race, an independent candidate
challenged that any television news segments featuring the incumbent
mayor entitled him to equal airtime under section 315.22 The Federal
15.

§ 315, 48 Stat. at 1088 (codified in part as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315
(2006)).

16.

Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 30.

17.

47 U.S.C. § 315.

18.

Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934); see also In re
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. and Nat’l Broad. Co., 26 F.C.C. 715, 730
(1959) (noting that section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927 was carried
forward later as section 315 of the Communications Act).

19.

67 Cong. Rec. 5,558 (1926) (statement of Sen. Luther Johnson).

20.

67 Cong. Rec. 12,502 (1926) (statement of Sen. Earl B. Mayfield).

21.

Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 32 (“Section 315 caused no serious
problems until the advent of television, and then it quickly became clear
that access to this new medium was essential for any politician seeking
to gain or maintain public office.”).

22.

See In re Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 26 F.C.C. at 716–17. (“Lar Daly
[independent mayoral candidate] filed a complaint with the Commission
alleging that certain Chicago television stations had, in the course of
their newscasts, shown film clips of his primary opponents in connection
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Communications Commission (FCC)—the regulatory authority
responsible for enforcing the Communications Act—agreed.23 In its
decision, the FCC noted that in 1956, Congress considered a “CBSsponsored amendment to exempt news and other broadcasts from
section 315” but failed to pass such an amendment.24 As a result,
Congress responded almost immediately by amending the Act to
allow “legally qualified candidate[s]” to appear in a “(1) bona fide
newscast, (2) bona fide news interview, (3) bona fide news
documentary,” or “(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events,”
without triggering the equal time rule.25
Following this amendment by Congress, the next major issue
became whether debates were to be considered bona fide news events.
If not, televised debates would be subject to the equal time rule, and
the opportunity to participate would need to be available to all legally
qualified candidates. Before this issue would be decided, Congress
passed a resolution to suspend section 315 of the Communications Act
for the 1960 presidential race.26 This opened the door for the 1960
debates between Richard Nixon and John Kennedy, which enabled
nearly 70 million Americans to view presidential candidates square off
in a televised debate for the first time in history.27
Despite the excitement that followed these “Great Debates,”28 just
two years later in In re Inquiry Concerning Section 315 of the
Communications Act of 1934 As Amended (Goodwill Station, Inc.),29
the FCC declined to interpret “bona fide news events” as including
debates.30 In Goodwill Station, during a 1962 Michigan gubernatorial

with certain events and occasions; that he had requested equal time of
said stations; and that his requests had been refused.”).
23.

Id. at 743 (“We are further of the opinion that when a station uses film
clips showing a candidate during the course of a newscast, that
appearance of a candidate can reasonably be said to be a use, within the
meaning and intent of section 315.”).

24.

Id. at 734 (emphasis omitted).

25.

Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557 (1959) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)
(2006)).

26.

Joint Resolution of Aug. 24, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-677, 74 Stat. 554
(“[S]ection 315(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 . . . is suspended
for the period of the 1960 presidential and vice presidential
campaigns . . . .”).

27.

See Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 27–28.

28.

See id. at 41 (noting that the Kennedy-Nixon debates “appeared to
usher in a new age of political communication”).

29.

40 F.C.C. 362 (1962).

30.

Id. at 363 (1962) (ruling that debates are not exempted from section 315
in part because before the enactment of the 1959 amendments to the
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race, a Socialist Labor Party candidate complained to the FCC that
he was entitled to equal time after a radio station broadcasted a
dinner debate between the Democratic and Republican candidates.31
The FCC ruled in favor of the Socialist Labor Party candidate, even
though it found that his party only gathered 0.04% of the vote in the
previous election32 and that the station merely played a passive role in
covering the debate.33 Although an FCC Chairman at the time of
Goodwill Station later lamented the agency’s decision in that case,34
the FCC did not revisit the issue again for over a decade.
In 1975, the FCC finally overruled Goodwill Station when it
responded to a petition urging the agency to issue an interpretation of
section 315 that would include debates within the meaning of the
“bona fide news events” exemption.35 The FCC agreed with the
petitioners’ argument that Goodwill Station was “based on . . . an
incorrect reading of the legislative history” and that Congress never
intended the “unduly restrictive approach” of discouraging news
coverage of political debates.36 However, in order for a debate to
qualify as a “bona fide news event” that is outside the reach of the
equal time rule of section 315, the debate must also (1) be broadcast
live in its entirety37 and (2) be sponsored by an independent

Act, “Congress had considered bills which would have exempted debate”
but did not provide for such an exemption in the law that was passed).
31.

Id. at 362–63.

32.

See id. at 363 (“[T]he Socialist Labor Party received 1,479 votes in a
state-wide total vote of 3,255,991.”).

33.

See id. at 362–63 (noting that the radio station “play[ed] no part in the
selection or production of the program[ ]”; “exercise[d] no control
whatsoever” over its content; and contended it merely covered the
debate for its “exceptional newsworthiness”).

34.

See Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 41 (“In retrospect, there is no
decision I made in public life that I regret more. I regret it because I
now believe it to have been an incorrect legal interpretation of
Section 315. I also regret it because it led to bad policy effects in 1964,
1968, and 1972.”).

35.

In re Aspen Inst. Program on Commc’n and Soc’y and CBS, Inc., 55
F.C.C.2d 697, 697, 703 (1975).

36.

Id. at 703, 705 (“Rather, Congress intended that the [FCC] would
determine whether the broadcaster had in such cases made reasonable
news judgments as to the newsworthiness of certain events . . . .”).

37.

See id. at 703.
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organization.38 Challenges were brought against this decision, but
courts deferred to the FCC’s new interpretation.39
B.
1.

Sponsorship of the Presidential Debates

The League of Women Voters and the Origin of the Commission on
Presidential Debates (CPD)

Following the FCC’s decision allowing debates to be categorized
as news events that were exempt from the equal time rule, televised
debates were now feasible. The League of Women Voters became the
initial organizers of presidential debates, satisfying the sponsorship
requirement under the new interpretation.40 The League sponsored the
debates in the 1976, 1980, and 1984 elections. In the 1980 election, the
League invited third-party candidate John Anderson to participate in
the debate thanks to his twenty percent show of support in the polls.41
But following Anderson’s invitation, President Jimmy Carter refused
to participate, leaving only Anderson and Ronald Reagan to
participate.42 Carter’s refusal was considered a “disappointing failure”
for the League because it “fail[ed] to give voters an opportunity to see
and hear all of the serious presidential contenders at the same time.”43
This disappointing result, coupled with increasingly hostile
negotiations during the 1984 election, led the two major parties to
believe they would need to become responsible for the debate in order
to make each other and their own candidates more accountable.44
In November 1985, the chairmen of the Democratic and
Republican National Committees coauthored a memorandum that
concluded the two parties “should . . . principally and jointly
sponsor[ ] and conduct[ ]” future joint appearances of their candidates,
in order to “better fulfill [their] parties’ responsibilities for educating
and informing the American public and to strengthen the role of
38.

See id. at 714–15; see also Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 46
(“[T]he Aspen decision . . . came with a significant hitch: it did not
allow stations themselves to organize candidate debates.”).

39.

See, e.g., Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“[W]e
are obligated to defer to the [FCC’s] interpretation, even if it is not the
only interpretation possible.”).

40.

See Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 46 (“The Aspen proposal was
made with a willing sponsor in mind: the League of Women Voters of
the United States.”).

41.

Anthony Corrado, Background Paper to Let America Decide: The
Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on
Presidential Debates 39, 61–62 (1975).

42.

Id. at 62.

43.

Minow & Lamay, supra note 13, at 57.

44.

Id. at 57–62.
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political parties in the electoral process.”45 Just fifteen months later,
the committee chairmen of the two major parties announced the
creation of the Commission on Presidential Debates.46 The parties’
press release described the CPD as “a bipartisan, non-profit, tax
exempt organization formed to implement joint sponsorship of general
election presidential and vice presidential debates, starting in 1988.”47
While the CPD’s press release assumed it would take sole
responsibility for future presidential and vice presidential debates,48
the League did not immediately surrender its role. After negotiations
regarding the 1988 presidential debates, the two organizations
compromised that the CPD would sponsor the first debate and the
League would sponsor the second.49 However, in preparing for the
second debate, the League received a “memorandum of
understanding” from the campaigns for Vice President Bush and
Governor Dukakis; the memorandum essentially contained a list of
demands needed for the candidates’ participation.50
As a result, the League withdrew its sponsorship because it felt
“the demands of the two campaign organizations would perpetrate a
fraud on the American voter.”51 The most objectionable factor cited
was the “unprecedented control” sought by the two major parties,
which included demands for “the selection of questioners, the

45.

Memorandum of Agreement on Presidential Candidate Joint
Appearances from Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr., Chairman of the
Republican National Committee, and Paul G. Kirk, Jr., Chairman of
the Democratic National Committee (Nov. 26, 1985) [hereinafter
Memorandum of Agreement], available at http://www.opendebates.org
/theissue/memo.jpg.

46.

Press Release, Democratic and Republican National Committees, RNC
and DNC Establish Commission on Presidential Debates (Feb. 18,
1987), [hereinafter CPD Press Release], available at http://www.open
debates.org/theissue/CPDrelease.pdf.

47.

Id.

48.

See id. (“We applaud the League for laying a foundation from which we
can assume our own responsibilities . . . [and] we would expect and
encourage the League’s participation in sponsoring other debates,
particularly in the presidential primary process.”).

49.

Revealing History, OpenDebates.org, http://www.opendebates.org/
theissue/strengthenmajorparties.html.

50.

See Memorandum of Understanding from Vice President Bush and
Governor Dukakis’ representatives (1988), available at http://web.archive.
org/web/20121019085633/http://www.museum.tv/debateweb/html/hist
ory/1988/88essay/memorandum.htm (providing very detailed rules
governing the dates, location, times, format, moderator selection,
panelist selection, staging, ticket distribution, seating arrangements,
dressing rooms, and holding rooms, among other miscellaneous rules).

51.

League, supra note 2.
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composition of the audience, hall access for the press and other
issues.”52 League President Nancy M. Neuman further stated:
It has become clear to us that the candidates’ organizations aim
to add debates to their list of campaign-trail charades devoid of
substance, spontaneity and honest answers to tough
questions . . . . The League has no intention of becoming an
accessory to the hoodwinking of the American public.53

The League’s withdrawal left the CPD as the lone staging
organization that the two major parties would agree to use. It has
sponsored each presidential debate since 1988.54
2.

CPD Eligibility Requirements for Participants

The CPD is legally obligated to use objective, nonpartisan criteria
in choosing the debate participants.55 For the first three elections it
sponsored the presidential debates, the CPD did not use any
quantitative measures. In 1988, the CPD considered three criteria in
selecting its debate participants: (1) evidence of national organization,
(2) signs of national newsworthiness, and (3) indications of public
concern. No third-party candidates were invited.56 By 1992, the CPD
developed the “realistic chance” standard.57 Even though third-party
candidate Ross Perot’s public support was as low as nine percent in
the polls, an advisory committee concluded the possibility of his
election was not unrealistic, so the CPD invited him to the debates.58

52.

Id.

53.

See League, supra note 2.

54.

Our Mission, Debates.org, http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=
about-cpd.

55.

See 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(c) (2012) (“For all debates, staging
organization(s) must use pre-established objective criteria to determine
which candidates may participate in a debate. For general election
debates, staging organizations(s) shall not use nomination by a
particular political party as the sole objective criterion to determine
whether to include a candidate in a debate.”).

56.

Minow & Lamay, supra note 13, at 91.

57.

Id.; see also Letter from Richard E. Neustadt to Paul G. Kirk, Jr. and
Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr., Commission on Presidential Debates
(Sept. 17, 1996) [hereinafter Neustadt Letter], available at http://cgi.cnn.
com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/news/9609/18/election.commission/letter.sht
ml (describing the realistic chance standard as a “chance [that] need not
be overwhelming but must be more than theoretical”).

58.

Minow & Lamay, supra note 13, at 91–92; but see Amato, supra note 6,
at 226 (stating that Perot’s inclusion in the 1992 debates was a demand
of the George H.W. Bush campaign after “calculating, erroneously, that
Perot appealed to Bill Clinton voters more than Bush voters”).
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Despite finishing the 1992 election with 18.7% of the popular vote,59
the CPD declined to invite Perot to the 1996 debates after the
advisory committee determined he did not meet the realistic chance
standard.60 A number of media outlets fiercely criticized the decision
to exclude Perot.61 In response, the CPD decided to make its
eligibility requirements more quantitative and unambiguous by the
2000 election.62
This concern for objectivity led to the development of the
eligibility rules that remain in place today. The CPD has established
three requirements for a candidate to be eligible for participation in
the debates. Each candidate must (1) be constitutionally eligible,63
(2) appear on the ballots in states whose cumulative total of Electoral
College votes is 270 or more,64 and (3) indicate a level of support of at
least 15% in an average of five national polls.65
3.

Challengers to the CPD

The CPD and other staging organizations are no strangers to
litigation. Third-party candidates have a long history of suing—under
a range of legal theories—for inclusion in the televised debates during
election season.66 Rather frequent subjects of litigation include the
59.

Minow & Lamay, supra note 13, at 92.

60.

See Neustadt Letter, supra note 57 (“We have concluded that, at this
stage of the campaign, Mr. Perot has no real chance either of popular
election in November or of subsequent election by the House of
Representatives, in the event no candidate obtains an Electoral College
majority.”); see also Amato, supra note 6, at 226 (stating that Perot’s
exclusion was influenced by the Dole campaign’s adamant insistence
that Perot not be invited).

61.

See, e.g., Fixing the Presidential Debates, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1996,
at A20 (“[B]y deciding yesterday to exclude Ross Perot from this year’s
debates, the commission proved itself to be a tool of the two dominant
parties rather than a guardian of the public interest.”); Editorial,
Include Perot in Debates; Abolish Dysfunctional Debate Commission,
Sun-Sentinel, Sept. 20, 1996, at A22 (calling the CPD’s decision “an
outrageous, unfair, discriminatory violation of Perot’s rights and an
intolerable effort to muzzle his minority views”).

62.

Minow & Lamay, supra note 13, at 93.

63.

U.S. Const. art. II, § 1 (requiring a candidate to be a natural born
citizen, of at least thirty-five years of age, and a U.S. resident for at
least fourteen years, to be “eligible to the Office of President”).

64.

This represents the “theoretical” chance of winning the election. See
2012 Criteria, supra note 7 (providing that a candidate must “have at
least a mathematical chance of securing an Electoral College majority in
the 2012 general election”).

65.

Id.

66.

See generally Eric B. Hull, Note, Independent Candidates’ Battle
Against the Exclusionary Practices of the Commission on Presidential
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CPD’s partisanship and the 15% polling requirement. For example, in
2000, Patrick J. Buchanan—the presidential candidate for the Reform
Party—filed a complaint with the Federal Election Commission
(FEC) alleging that because the CPD violated FEC regulations with
regard to its political affiliations67 and selection criteria,68 it could not
qualify as a debate-staging organization.69 After the FEC dismissed
his administrative complaint, Buchanan challenged its decision in
federal court.70
While the district court ultimately upheld the FEC’s dismissal of
Buchanan’s complaint,71 it appeared reluctant to do so. In refusing to
overturn the FEC’s determination that the CPD is nonpartisan,72 the
court noted the “extremely deferential standard of review” it had to
apply and that “the FEC is entitled to the benefit of the doubt even
if the unfortunate by-product of the FEC’s decision is increased public
cynicism about the integrity of our electoral system.”73 The court
hinted at some skepticism with the 15% threshold,74 but it
nevertheless declined to override the FEC’s finding that this
requirement was both “reasonable” and “objective.”75 The court again
Debates, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 313 (2004) (reviewing the history of litigation
against the CPD and other staging organizations, which includes
challenges regarding the First Amendment, organizations’ tax-exempt
status, organizations’ partisanship, acceptance of corporate sponsorships,
and selection criteria).
67.

See 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(a) (2012) (providing that only organizations that
“do not endorse, support, or oppose political candidates or political
parties may stage candidate debates”).

68.

See § 110.13(c) (requiring “pre-established objective
determine which candidates may participate in a debate”).

69.

See Buchanan v. FEC, 112 F. Supp. 2d 58, 61–62 (D.D.C. 2000)
(describing Buchanan’s administrative complaint).

70.

Id. at 62.

71.

Id. at 76.

72.

See id. at 72 (“[T]he FEC found evidence of possible past influence
simply insufficient to justify disbelieving the CPD’s sworn statement,
corroborated by the [Democratic and Republican National Committees],
that the CPD’s 2000 debate criteria were [not] influenced by the two
major parties.”).

73.

Id. at 73.

74.

See id. at 74 (“A reasonable person could find it ironic that a candidate
need win only 5% of the popular vote to be eligible for federal funding,
but must meet a 15% threshold to be eligible for the debates. However,
the relevant test is not based on irony, but on objectivity.”).

75.

Id. With regard to the “reasonableness” element, the court stated, “[t]he
history of 11 C.F.R. § 110.13 makes clear that, although the word
‘reasonable’ does not appear in the regulation’s text, ‘reasonableness is
implied.’” Id. (quoting 60 Fed. Reg. 64,262 (Dec. 14, 1995)).
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noted the “substantial deference [it] must accord to the FEC’s
interpretation of its own regulations.”76 In light of this deference, the
court did not find the FEC interpretations to be arbitrary or
capricious—even though the court acknowledged that “it might be
good public policy to allow more third party candidates into the
presidential debates.”77
Other third-party suits against the CPD have ended in a fashion
similar to Buchanan’s. At this point, no third-party suit for inclusion
in the televised presidential debates has been successful.78 But there is
some evidence—like the dicta in Buchanan—that courts are not
entirely settled on the idea of having only two parties involved in
presidential debates. Therefore, despite the lack of success, courts may
be listening with open ears as third-party candidates continue to use
the courts to pursue a debate podium.
4.

Challenging the CPD Under a New Theory: Antitrust Violations

Gary Johnson, the 2012 presidential candidate for the Libertarian
party, recently continued this pursuit by seeking inclusion under
antitrust law principles—a legal theory novel in its application to the
CPD or any staging organization. On September 21, 2012, Johnson
filed an antitrust suit alleging that (1) the CPD was formed and run
by both the Republican and Democratic National Committees and
(2) the 15% polling requirement is a conspiracy to restrain commerce
by unfairly limiting the opportunities of other competitors to obtain
the salaried position of the United States Presidency.79 Since this
complaint does not involve an agency’s interpretation of a statute, it
would not face the substantial challenge of overcoming the “extremely
deferential standard of review” a court must use in such
interpretations.80
76.

Buchanan, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 74.

77.

Id. at 76.

78.

Hull, supra note 66, at 323; see, e.g., Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381 (1st
Cir. 2000) (arguing that FEC regulations allowing corporate funding
violated FECA); Natural Law Party of the United States v. FEC, 111
F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2000) (challenging the CPD’s selection criteria
from 1996); Perot v. FEC, 97 F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (challenging the
partisanship of the CPD, but the court declined jurisdiction because the
plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies first); Fulani v.
Brady, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (seeking to invalidate the CPD’s
tax-exempt status).

79.

Complaint, Johnson v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 8:2012cv01600
(filed Sept. 21, 2012). As of April 2013, nothing has been decided in this
case. However, Johnson did seek to enjoin the 2012 debates unless he
was entitled to participate, and this was not successful. Each debate
went on as scheduled, featuring only the candidates of the two major
parties.

80.

Buchanan, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
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While Johnson is certainly not the first to accuse the CPD of
being controlled by the two major parties,81 the goal of this Note is
not to establish the veracity of this claim. Instead, this Note explores
whether antitrust could be applied as a viable remedy, even if the
facts alleged by Johnson are assumed to be true.

II. Obstacles to Reaching the Merits
Plaintiffs seeking to sue political parties and staging organizations
under antitrust law would need to overcome a few obstacles before the
court reaches the merits of the claim. First, a plaintiff must show that
he or she has standing.82 Second, the plaintiff must persuade a court
that the political activity exemption to the Sherman Act does not
extend to candidates seeking to obtain political office.83
A.

Standing

A third-party candidate suing the CPD for antitrust violations
would not have an issue with the standing requirement for
jurisdiction. In order to satisfy standing in a suit against the CPD, a
plaintiff must establish (1) an “injury in fact,” (2) a causal connection
between the injury and the defendant’s conduct, and (3) that a
favorable decision would “likely” redress the injury.84 Missing out on
an opportunity to participate in the debates typically suffices as an
injury in fact because of its instrumentality to a candidate’s success in
the election.85 Third-party candidates only fail to meet the causation
81.

See, e.g., Buchanan, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (“[T]he CPD is not a
nonpartisan organization, but rather a bipartisan organization
supporting the Democratic and Republican parties while opposing third
parties . . . .”); see also, e.g., George Farah, No Debate: How The
Republican and Democratic Parties Secretly Control the
Presidential Debates 10 (2004) (claiming that the CPD is a
fraudulent, bipartisan organization seeking to keep at bay any potential
threats to the two major parties); Brennan Center for
Justice et al., Deterring Democracy: How the Commission on
Presidential Debates Undermines Democracy 3 (2004) (“The
CPD secretly submits to the demands of the Republican and Democratic
candidates. . . . [and] [m]asquerad[es] as a nonpartisan sponsor . . . .”).

82.

See infra Part II.A.

83.

See infra Part II.B.

84.

Buchanan, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 62–63 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

85.

See Buchanan, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 65 (“[P]laintiffs will suffer such an
injury—the loss of an opportunity to participate in the presidential
debates which few would doubt can be instrumental to a candidate’s
success in the general election.”); see also Fulani v. League of Women
Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 626 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he loss of
competitive advantage flowing from the . . . exclusion of Fulani from the
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element where the causal nexus is too attenuated.86 By suing the CPD
directly, third-party candidates would create an immediate link to the
source of the alleged injury and put to rest any causation issue.
The redressibility requirement is met if a favorable decision could
have redressed the plaintiff’s injury at the time he or she brought the
suit.87 A judgment preserving the possibility of participation in the
debates would qualify as a relief that would redress the plaintiff’s
injury.88 If the debates are over by the time the court hears the case,
it would become an issue of mootness.89 However, mootness here
would not be a difficult obstacle to overcome because third-partyinclusion suits qualify for the “capable of repetition, yet evading
review” exception.90
Standing is typically not an issue for suits seeking third-party
inclusion in the debates. The situations where it has precluded courts
from reaching the merits of a case would not apply to a plaintiff
alleging Johnson’s claim.91

national debates constitutes sufficient ‘injury’ for standing purposes,
because such loss palpably impaired Fulani’s ability to compete on an
equal footing with other significant presidential candidates.”).
86.

See Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1991) cert. denied
502 U.S. 1048 (1992) (suing the IRS was too attenuated to establish
standing in a suit seeking inclusion in the debates); cf. Buchanan, 112 F.
Supp. 2d at 68 (“Here, by contrast [to Fulani v. Brady], plaintiffs have
sued the FEC . . . . By eliminating the IRS as a link in the chain of
causation, plaintiffs take a giant leap closer to the actual source of
harm[, the CPD].”).

87.

E.g., Becker v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 230 F.3d 381, 389 cert. denied
532 U.S. 1007 (2001) (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that Nadar’s injury could
have been redressed by a judgment that prevented corporate
sponsorship of debates and allowed him to participate); see also
Advanced Mgmt. Tech., Inc. v. FAA, 211 F.3d 633, 636 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (“Standing is assessed ‘at the time the action commences’. . . .”
(quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000))).

88.

Becker, 230 F.3d at 389.

89.

Id.

90.

Id. (“As other courts have held in similar cases, this sort of case
qualifies for the exception to mootness for disputes ‘capable of
repetition, yet evading review’: corporate sponsorship of the debates is
sure to be challenged again in future elections, yet, as here, the short
length of the campaign season will make a timely resolution difficult.”);
League of Women Voters, 882 F.2d at 628 (2d Cir. 1989); Johnson v.
FCC, 829 F.2d 157, 159 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).

91.

See Brady, 935 F.2d at 1331 (failing to meet the causation element when
suing the IRS for inclusion); Crist v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates,
262 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2001) (supporters of third parties lack standing to sue
for a candidate’s exclusion from the debates); Perot v. FEC, 97 F.3d 553,
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B.

“Political Activity” Exemption

Third-party candidates seeking inclusion to the debates through
antitrust law would need to show that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
does not apply. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine stands for the general
principle that the Sherman Act does not apply to political activity
with regard to influencing legislative action. In Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,92 long-distance
trucking companies brought an antitrust claim against twenty-four
major railroad companies, alleging the companies hired a public
relations firm to campaign against the truckers and lobby for laws
that would be destructive for the rival trucking business.93 The
Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act does not apply to joint
ventures seeking to persuade the legislative or the executive branches
“to take particular action with respect to a law that would produce a
restraint or a monopoly.”94 The Court broadly stated that political
activity has no basis in the legislative history of the Act, and that the
Act is “not at all appropriate” for the “political arena.”95
The situation in United Mine Workers v. Pennington96 was very
similar to that in Noerr. In Pennington, a coal labor union and some
larger coal companies jointly and successfully persuaded the Secretary
of Labor to raise minimum wages to a point that would drive out
smaller coal companies.97 A group of those smaller companies brought
an antitrust suit against the union and larger companies. The
Supreme Court held that the Noerr rule applied to this situation as
well, that it “shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to
influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose,”98 and that it
was necessary to instruct the jury of this shield.99
The Supreme Court’s decision to award an antitrust exemption
for political activity would appear to bar antitrust suits against
political parties and the CPD, but there is a notable distinction. The
561 (D.C. Cir. 1996) cert. denied 520 U.S. 1210 (1997) (finding that Perot
lacked standing after failing to initially produce the administrative record).
92.

365 U.S. 127, 129 (1961).

93.

Id. at 129.

94.

Id. at 136.

95.

Id. at 137, 140–41.

96.

381 U.S. 657 (1965).

97.

Id. at 660.

98.

Id. at 669–70.

99.

See id. (“Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the
antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition. . . . The jury
should have been so instructed and, given the obviously telling nature of
this evidence, we cannot hold this lapse to be mere harmless error.”).
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Noerr-Pennington doctrine deals with political activity in that it
refuses to extend the Sherman Act to situations in which
organizations are persuading official legislative actions of individuals
already holding government office. In cases against the CPD,
however, there is no official action by the government. The CPD and
its televised debates involve actions of those seeking to obtain a
political office, not actions of those already in office. While the
exclusion of third-party candidates may be a strategy to influence
governmental policy similar to the parties in Noerr and Pennington,
the difference is that the CPD’s alleged strategy is far more
attenuated. Noerr and Pennington each involved private parties
seeking to change a specific governmental policy by influencing those
already in power. The exclusion of third-party candidates would be an
attempt to prevent others from ever reaching that position of power.

III. Elements of a Section 1 Violation Applied
Assuming the first two threshold hurdles are met and the court
reaches the merits of the case, a plaintiff would then need to prove
that the staging organization’s selection criteria constitute a restraint
of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.100 Section 1
provides that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the

100. This Note dedicates its focus to a section 1 claim; nevertheless, it is
noteworthy that just a decade ago, a third-party candidate could have
potentially made a compelling argument for a section 2 violation of the
Sherman Act through the “essential facilities” doctrine. To qualify as an
“essential facility,” a plaintiff must show that there are no feasible
alternatives and that “denial of its use inflicts a ‘severe handicap’
on potential market entrants.” Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health &
Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1990) (emphasis and alteration
omitted) (quoting Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C.
Cir. 1997)). If an “essential facility” is found, the Supreme Court has
held that the defendants must provide access to competitors on a
nondiscriminatory basis and in a reasonable manner. Third-party
candidates could have alleged that the debates were an “essential
facility” because access is necessary to a successful campaign, that they
are excluded unreasonably, and that if the Republican and Democratic
National Committees control the CPD, they would not participate in
other staged debates, making duplication impossible. Arguments for the
instrumentality of the debates and the unreasonableness of the 15%
requirement are discussed infra Part III.C and evidence of major-party
control of the CPD are discussed infra Part III.A. In 2004, however, the
Supreme Court held that the “essential facilities” doctrine is not
appropriate where a regulatory agency has the ability to compel access.
Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004). Thus, since the FEC could
compel access through its regulations, the “essential facilities” doctrine
is likely no longer a viable option.
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several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”101 To
establish a section 1 violation, a plaintiff must show three elements:
(1) an agreement or conspiracy exists between two entities, (2) this
agreement affects interstate commerce, and (3) this agreement
constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade.102
A.

Agreement or Conspiracy

The agreement or conspiracy element is reflective of the fact that
section 1 of the Sherman Act only applies to concerted action.103 To
qualify as concerted action, the parties involved do not need to be
legally distinct entities.104 Instead, courts favor a “functional
consideration of how the parties involved in the alleged
anticompetitive conduct actually operate.”105 This functional approach
has resulted in numerous instances in which a single legal entity was
still found to have engaged in concerted activity.106 The Supreme
Court has explained that it will look to “the central substance of the

101. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
102. Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Res., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 893, 917
(S.D. Ohio 1981), aff’d, 691 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1982). The analysis for a
section 1 violation of the Sherman Act has also been summarized as a
“two-part test.” If a plaintiff can meet the “threshold requirements”—
showing concerted action that affects interstate commerce—courts will
move to the “competitive effects test,” which requires the showing of an
unreasonable restraint of competition. See Marc Edelman, A Short
Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: Why the NCAA’s No-Pay
Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
65, 71 (2013).
103. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2208 (2010) (“Section 1
only applies to concerted action that restrains trade.”); see also
Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768–69 (1984)
(noting that Congress “treated concerted behavior more strictly than
unilateral behavior” because concerted activity is “fraught with
anticompetitive risk” since it “deprives the marketplace of independent
centers of decisionmaking”).
104. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2209.
105. Id.
106. See id. (noting that legally single entities “violate[ ] § 1 when the entity
was controlled by a group of competitors and served, in essence, as a
vehicle for ongoing concerted activity”); United States v. Sealy, Inc.,
388 U.S. 350, 356 (1967) (finding Sealy, Inc., which owned and
controlled a group of mattress manufacturers, met the concerted activity
requirement because Sealy was not “a separate entity, but . . . an
instrumentality of the individual manufacturers”); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944) (holding that the Associated Press, a
cooperative association of newspapers, acted in concert despite being a
single legal entity incorporated under New York law).
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situation,” and therefore will be “moved by the identity of the persons
who act, rather than the label of their hats.”107
A single legal entity can even be found to act in concert when it
comprises competitors.108 For example, in Associated Press v. United
States,109 the Supreme Court held that a cooperative association
comprising competitor newspapers violated section 1 by acting in
concert through its bylaws that allowed members to block nonmember
competitors from membership and prohibited members from selling to
nonmembers.110 These bylaws “in and of themselves were contracts in
restraint of commerce in that they contained provisions designed to
stifle competition in the newspaper publishing field” and “had
hindered and impeded the growth of competing newspapers.”111
Even though the CPD is legally a single entity, a third-party
candidate could make a compelling case that, despite the “label of its
hat,” the staging organization is actually run by the Democratic and
Republican National Committees. Notably, the two chairmen of the
major parties announced the formation of the CPD as a “bipartisan”
organization,112 and each of these prominent figures continued to play
influential roles in the CPD.113 In Buchanan v. Federal Election
107. Sealy, 388 U.S. at 353.
108. See Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Through an Antitrust Lens,
92 Colum. L. Rev. 497, 506 (1992) (“In a variety of cases, courts have
found the Section 1 concert of action requirement satisfied when
participants in an enterprise are also competitors.”).
109. 326 U.S. 1 (1944).
110. Id. at 11–13.
111. Id.
112. See CPD Press Release, supra note 46 (calling the CPD “a bipartisan,
non-profit, tax-exempt organization formed to implement joint
sponsorship of general election presidential and vice-presidential
debates”); see also Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 45 (“It is
our bipartisan view that a primary responsibility of each major political
party is to educate and inform the American electorate . . . .
Therefore, . . . it is our conclusion that joint appearances should be
principally and jointly sponsored and conducted by the Republican and
Democratic National Committees.”); Amato, supra note 6, at 226
(noting that Frank Fahrenkopf, former chairman of the Republican
National Committee, admitted in a sworn deposition that the CPD was
only officially formed as a nonpartisan entity because the lawyers
counseled them that they “probably couldn’t do it if [they] were a
bipartisan entity”).
113. See Jamin B. Raskin, The Debate Gerrymander, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1943,
1982 (1999) (“From the beginning, the CPD has been co-chaired by
none other than Frank Fahrenkopf and Paul Kirk, who had together
declared their commitment to bipartisan televised joint appearances and
both of whose party affiliations are continually and carefully noted in
major CPD communications.”); supra Part I.B.1 (discussing how the
chairmen of the Republican and Democratic Committees formed the CPD).
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Commission,114 the court acknowledged the reasonableness of such a
claim and further noted that the FEC’s finding to the contrary
created the “unfortunate by-product of . . . increased public cynicism
about the integrity of our electoral system.”115
While no court has made a factual finding that the CPD is run by
the two major parties, courts have typically been bound by the
“extremely deferential standard of review” owed to the FEC’s
interpretation.116 Under an antitrust claim, no such deference would
be required. Instead, courts would have much more room to allow for
this factual determination because the Supreme Court has endorsed a
functional approach that asks courts to look at the “essence” of an
entity.117 Thus, it is reasonable to think that a court could find the
CPD is controlled by a group of competitors and thus able to act in
concert for purposes of the Sherman Act.
B.

Effect on Interstate Commerce
1.

Debates as Commerce

The second threshold issue in an antitrust case is establishing that
the alleged concerted activity affects interstate commerce. While the
majority of case law on this element focuses on the interstate aspect,
the activity must still implicate commerce.118 Showing that the
presidential debates constitute commercial activity for purposes of the
Sherman Act would likely be the toughest obstacle for a third-party
candidate to overcome. Only one case has ever discussed an issue
close to this one, and the court held that holding a political office did
not implicate commerce under antitrust law.119 But it can be
distinguished.120 Since this is a novel legal issue, there are no
precedents directly on point. Therefore, the best a third-party
candidate could do is argue that other instances where commerce were
found are sufficiently analogous to this situation. This section
discusses a few different arguments a third-party candidate could
make. Even if none of these arguments are persuasive enough
standing alone, courts will classify the nature of conduct as
114. 112 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000).
115. Id. at 73.
116. Id. (applying the deferential standard although “reasonable people could
certainly disagree about whether the CPD’s credibility determination
[by the FEC] was correct”).
117. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2209 (2010).
118. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 665 (3d Cir. 1993)
(“[W]hen [parties] perform acts that are the antithesis of commercial
activity, they are immune from antitrust regulation.”).
119. Sheppard v. Lee, 929 F.2d 496, 498 (9th Cir. 1991).
120. Discussed infra Part III.B.2.
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commercial or noncommercial in light of the totality of
circumstances.121 Therefore, in light of a combination of reasonable
arguments, a court could classify the CPD’s role in staging
presidential debates as affecting commerce.
a.

Presidency as a Salaried Position

Under the Sherman Act, “commerce” is not limited to interstate
commerce.122 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,123 the Court held that
the exchange of services for money constitutes commerce for Sherman
Act purposes and that minimum fee schedules prescribed by the
county bar constituted price fixing in violation of section 1.124 The Bar
had sought an exclusion from antitrust regulation, “arguing that
learned professions are not ‘trade or commerce.’”125 The Court
rejected this argument, however, stating that the “nature of an
occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the
Sherman Act, nor is the public-service aspect of professional practice
controlling in determining whether § 1 includes professions.”126
Further, the Court held that the examination of a land title is a
service, and “the exchange of such a service for money is ‘commerce’
in the most common usage of that word.”127
Applying Goldfarb to the subject of this Note, the Court’s
statements that the nature of an occupation alone does not bar
Sherman Act litigation tends to suggest that a political office could be
open to antitrust claims. More specifically, the fact that a position’s
public-service nature is not controlling seems to further section 1’s
applicability given the public-service nature of holding a political
office. Lastly, if the exchange of services for money constitutes
commerce for the purposes of the Sherman Act, holding the position
of the president could constitute commerce since it is a salaried
position in which services are rendered in exchange for money.

121. Brown, 5 F.3d at 666 (3rd Cir. 1993).
122. See United States v. Natl. Ass’n of Real Est. Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 488
(“The fact that no interstate commerce is involved is not a barrier to
this suit. Section 3 of the Sherman Act is not leveled at interstate
activities alone. It also puts beyond the pale certain conduct purely local
in character and confined to the District of Columbia.”).
123. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
124. Id. at 782-88.
125. Id. at 787.
126. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787 (citation omitted); see also United States v.
Brown University, 5 F.3d 658, 666 (3rd Cir. 1993) (“The exchange of
money for services, even by a nonprofit organization, is a quintessential
commercial transaction.”).
127. Id. at 787–88.
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b.

Nonprofit Contributions and Sponsorships

The CPD is financed primarily through corporate sponsorships.128
Multinational corporations—some of the largest in the country129—
have donated millions of dollars to the staging organization.130 In
exchange for these donations, corporations receive an array of
benefits: tax-deductions,131 advertisement opportunities,132 and a
chance to make what amounts to a “bipartisan contribution.”133 In
addition to this reciprocal relationship, it has been argued that the
CPD benefits from third-party exclusion not only because it insulates
the two parties from competition but also because this exclusion
appeases its funding sources.134 Corporate sponsors of the CPD will
donate millions of dollars to the two major parties every year in order
to “sustain a business-friendly two-party system.”135 After such an
investment, these corporations “aren’t very eager to allow a thirdparty candidate the opportunity to ascend to the presidency and
thereby render their investment less valuable.”136 Under this theory, a
plaintiff could even argue that the CPD serves as a vehicle for
ensuring a return on investment for these corporations.
Even if a defendant’s activity is not in itself interstate commerce,
the Supreme Court has made clear that a plaintiff can still meet the
“effect on interstate commerce” element by showing that the activity
128. Corporate Sponsorship, Open Debates, http://www.opendebates.org/
theissue/corpsponsor.html (last updated Jan. 2, 2013).
129. See id. (“Tobacco giant Phillip Morris was a major sponsor in 1992 and
1996. Anheuser-Busch has sponsored presidential debates in 1996, 2000,
2004, 2008 and 2012.”).
130. Id.
131. See Farah, supra note 81 at 16 (“[D]onations to the CPD are taxdeductible.”).
132. See id. at 14 (describing how in 1992 Philip Morris was able to “hang a
large banner that was visible during postdebate interviews” after
donating $250,000 (citing Jonathan Groner & Sheila Kaplan, Buying
Smoke and Mirrors at the Debates, Legal Times, Nov. 2, 1992)); id.
(describing how in 2000 Anheuser-Busch was able to set up
informational booths at the debate site after donating $550,000 (citing
Joe Battenfeld, Company Sponsors’ Funds ‘Ad’ Up, Boston Herald,
Oct. 2, 2000, at 6)).
133. See id. at 15–16 (noting that corporations view a donation to the CPD
as a way to donate to both major parties simultaneously) (quoting an
interview with Nancy Neuman, former president of the League of
Women Voters, Aug. 24, 2001).
134. See id. at 16.
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Nathan Johnson, Presidential Debates Betray Democracy,
Press & Dakotan, Oct. 17, 2000).
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“has an effect on some other appreciable activity demonstrably in
interstate commerce.”137 A third-party candidate could argue that the
CPD’s quid-pro-quo relationship with such giant businesses helps
establish the debates’ link to commercial activity. For example,
advertising—which has been an antitrust issue on its own138—can
affect a company’s sales. Therefore, by offering advertising
opportunities to companies that do business across the country, the
CPD has arguably had “an effect on some other appreciable activity
demonstrably in interstate commerce,” thus meeting the second
threshold requirement to an antitrust claim.
The CPD’s status as a nonprofit organization would not serve as
a deterrent to antitrust litigation. The Supreme Court has plainly
stated that “[t]here is no doubt that the sweeping language of § 1
applies to nonprofit entities.”139 However, there are differing views
about the application of nonprofit contributions to antitrust law. In
Dedication and Everlasting Love to Animals v. The Humane
Society,140 the Ninth Circuit held that contributions to a nonprofit
organization did not constitute commerce under the Sherman Act,
and therefore there was no liability under the Act.141 But in United
States v. Brown University,142 the Third Circuit held that a nonprofit
entity can be subject to Sherman Act claims if it conducts
commercial, rather than “pure[ly] charit[able],” transactions.143 In its
analysis, the Brown court specifically noted that courts should classify
a transaction as commercial or noncommercial based on the nature of
the conduct in light of the totality of surrounding circumstances.144
While the CPD’s receipt of corporate funds may not on its own help
constitute commerce for purposes of the Sherman Act, the fact could
be weighed in the totality of circumstances and help tip the scales in
favor of third-party-candidate claims.

137. McLain v. Real Est. Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 233 (1980).
138. See Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, Efficiency and Image:
Advertising As an Antitrust Issue, 1990 Duke L.J. 321, 328 (1990)
(discussing how mass advertising creates anticompetitive effects through
entry barriers).
139. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100, n. 22 (1984).
140. 50 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 1995).
141. Id. at 712.
142. 5 F.3d 658 (3rd Cir. 1993).
143. Id. at 665–68 (finding a university properly subject to the Sherman Act
because “financial assistance to students is part and parcel of the
process of setting tuition and thus a commercial transaction”).
144. Id. at 666.
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c.

An Economic Doctrine Extended to the Political Arena

Politics and economics are certainly not interchangeable, but they
are nevertheless connected. In law, there is at least one example
where an economic doctrine has been extended to aid third-party
candidates. The “competitor standing doctrine” began as “well-settled
[law] that an economic actor may challenge the government’s
bestowal of an economic benefit on a competitor.”145 Courts then
“expanded the competitor standing doctrine to the political arena,
recognizing that political actors may bring suit when they are
competitively disadvantaged.”146 While this doctrine would not be
needed for a plaintiff alleging antitrust violations against the CPD, it
still demonstrates that courts have recognized a link between
economic activity and politics. Thus, it shows that there is a chance
courts could look beyond the presidential debates as purely political
and consider, in the totality of circumstances, its broader effects in
concluding that the debates sufficiently affect commerce for purposes
of the Sherman Act.
2.

Distinguishing Sheppard

While Gary Johnson was the first third-party candidate to allege
antitrust violations by a staging organization in its televised debates,
it is not the first time an aspiring candidate has sued under antitrust
law for exclusion in seeking to obtain political office. In Sheppard v.
Lee,147 an Arizona county road maintenance crew worker filed a
petition to run for a seat on the Apache County Board of
Supervisors.148 After learning of his intention, the members of the
Board unanimously voted to amend to the Apache County employee
rules and regulations to prohibit employees from running for any
elected office while they were still employed by the county.149 The
defendants then promptly fired Sheppard pursuant to this new
amendment.150 Sheppard responded by suing the Board under the
Sherman Act. But the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit rejected this argument, holding that “[d]ismissal of Sheppard’s
case was proper because neither the business of conducting the
145. Buchanan v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 112 F. Supp. 2d 58, 63 (D.D.C.
2000).
146. Id.
147. 929 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1991).
148. Id. at 497.
149. Id. The amendment provided that “[n]o employee may remain employed if
he offers himself for nomination or election to any salaried Apache County,
State of Arizona or Federal elective office unless that office will become
vacant at the next election by retirement of the elected official.” Id.
150. Id.
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government nor the holding of a political office constitutes ‘trade or
commerce’ within the meaning of the Sherman Act.”151
Such precedent is discouraging for third-party candidates hoping
antitrust law is their ticket to the debate, but it does not create an
insurmountable barrier because this case can be distinguished. In
Sheppard, the plaintiff was fired “pursuant to a May 16, 1988,
amendment to the Apache County employee rules and regulations,”152
meaning it was an official governmental action that was limiting his
opportunity to obtain the public office. Therefore, the court could
have reached the same conclusion without addressing whether holding
political office constituted commerce because the court could have
based its decision solely on the fact that it involved a governmental
action—where antitrust law does not apply according to the NoerrPennington doctrine.153
Another issue is that both Noerr and Pennington involved private
parties seeking to influence the government to use its power to
disadvantage their rivals. But in Sheppard, it is actual members of the
government seeking to insulate themselves from competition. This
appears to be more problematic since that is essentially what Johnson
is alleging—that the two major parties are using the debates to keep
third-party competition at bay. But the difference again lies in official
governmental action. In Sheppard, the Board passed an official
anticompetitive act. In a case such as Johnson’s, there is no official
act that has been passed to govern the selection criteria of the
debates. If Congress were to do so, it would then certainly be
insulated from antitrust law. But until then, this precedent would not
be overly detrimental.
C.

An Unreasonable Restraint

Not all concerted activity affecting interstate commerce is subject
to antitrust liability. Section 1, if read literally, would appear to bar
all contracts because most business deals restrain trade to some
degree.154 Consequently, in 1911, the Supreme Court held that the
restraint must be “unreasonably restrictive of competitive
conditions.”155 Thus, even if a court found that the CPD’s eligibility
151. Id. at 498.
152. Id. at 497.
153. See supra Part II.B.
154. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2208 (2010) (“Taken
literally, the applicability of § 1 to ‘every contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy’ could be understood to cover every conceivable
agreement . . . [section] 1 would address ‘the entire body of private
contract,’ that is not what the statute means.” (citing Nat’l Soc. of
Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978))).
155. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
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requirements met the two threshold elements, a third-party candidate
would still need to prove that the requirements were unreasonably
restrictive.
Restraints are usually analyzed under the “traditional ‘rule of
reason.’”156 The rule of reason is used where there is likely some
consumer benefit,157 and requires a court to “weigh[ ] all of the
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on
competition.”158 A plaintiff “bears an initial burden under the rule of
reason of showing that the alleged combination or agreement
produced adverse, anti-competitive effects within the relevant product
and geographic markets.”159 Therefore, in an antitrust suit against the
CPD, a plaintiff would bear the burden of proving that the eligibility
criteria are unreasonable after weighing all of the circumstances.
1.

Justifications for the 15% Requirement

A court would likely apply a rule of reason test because the CPD
has a number of reasonable justifications for its eligibility
requirements. The first two requirements—that a client be
constitutionally eligible and be on a number of ballots that would
make it mathematically possible to win the Electoral College—would
likely be conceded as justified because absent those two requirements,
the candidates would not even have a theoretical chance of winning.160
The criterion likely to receive the most scrutiny is the third element,
which requires a 15% showing of support in polls.161
In justifying the 15% requirement, the CPD would argue that the
most important goal of the debates is to ultimately give the voters a
chance to observe and decide between the two candidates with a “real
chance” of winning as they discuss their stances on key issues.162 In
fact, the original founders of the CPD described this aspect of the

156. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (1993) (quoting Cont’l
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)).
157. See also Edelman, supra note 102, at 73–75 (noting that there are three
sanctioned tests for a competitive effects analysis: (1) the per se test for
highly “nefarious” restraints that likely have no “redeeming value,”
(2) the rule of reason test for restraints that might benefit consumers,
and (3) the “abbreviated or quick-look rule of reason” for a
combination).
158. Cont’l T.V., 433 U.S. at 49.
159. Brown, 5 F.3d at 668.
160. See 2012 Criteria, supra note 7.
161. Id.
162. Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 95.
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debates as a “primary responsibility” of the two major parties.163 If
access to the debates becomes too easy for third-party candidates, the
CPD risks scaring away the major candidates and thus depriving
voters of a valuable opportunity to make an informed voting
decision.164 Further, new eligibility rules could create a disparate
impact on public confidence in the debates. More relaxed standards
for entry could lead to an overcrowded and chaotic event165 and open
the doors to some of the more extreme parties—reminiscent of
Senator Mayfield’s “bolshevism and communism” concern prior to the
enactment of the 1927 Radio Act.166
2.

Whether the 15% Requirement Is Overly Broad

While there are reasonable justifications for limiting access to the
debates, the restraint can still be unreasonable if it is broader than
necessary to achieve its legitimate objectives.167 A third-party
candidate could argue that the 15% requirement is overly broad
because it unduly limits access to a necessary event when less
restrictive alternatives are readily available.
a.

Necessity of Access to the Debates

Third-party candidates would argue that the 15% requirement is
still unreasonably restrictive because the threshold is too high for
access to a vehicle that is necessary for success.168 Media coverage is
“an essential component of a successful modern campaign” because it
legitimizes candidates and generates recognition, both of which are
“indispensible in attracting votes.”169 Voters expect to see their
163. See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 45 (“It is our bipartisan view
that a primary responsibility of each major political party is to educate
and inform the American electorate of its fundamental philosophy and
policies as well as its candidates’ positions on critical issues.”).
164. See Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 95.
165. See id. at 85–86 (discussing a crowded Italian political debate in which
the participating politicians began calling each other names such as
“drunkard” or “useful idiot”).
166. 67 Cong. Rec. 12,502 (daily ed. Jul. 1, 1926) (statement of Sen.
Earl B. Mayfield).
167. See United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1385 (5th
Cir. 1980) (holding that a realty service’s membership requirements
were “overly broad to accomplish any legitimate goals of the
association” in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act).
168. Id. at 1370 (“[W]hen the association possesses the requisite market
power, membership in the listing service becomes essential to a broker’s
ability to compete effectively, and the unreasonable (in competitive
terms) exclusion of a broker may create unjustified harm to the broker
and the public.”).
169. Rosenstone et al., supra note 5, at 33.
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candidates on television.170 The benefits of participation in the
presidential debates—the free publicity and opportunity to reach tens
of millions of voters—are irreplaceable in terms of campaign
strategy.171 Debates thus serve a monumental role in campaigns and
serve as a “defining feature of candidate viability.”172 In light of the
debates’ significance, the 15% requirement thus creates “something of
a catch-22. In order to gain popular support, the candidate must
participate in the debates; but in order to participate in televised
debates, the candidate must demonstrate popular support.”173
The CPD’s brief history reveals the potential efficiency of the
debates as a vehicle to gain support and the restrictive nature of its
criteria. In 1992, Ross Perot was the last third-party candidate to
participate in a presidential debate.174 Prior to the debates, Perot
polled at less than ten percent.175 After the debates, Perot
approximately doubled his support, as he was able to capture nearly
nineteen percent of the popular vote.176 Perot’s subsequent exclusion
from the 1996 debates under the same realistic chance standard led to
a public backlash, which influenced the CPD to amend its eligibility
requirements that are used to this day.177 Since the 15% requirement
has been enforced, no third-party candidates have been able to
participate in the debates.
Courts have also recognized the weighty competitive advantage
debate participants receive over nonparticipants. In Fulani v. League
of Women Voters Education Fund,178 the Second Circuit stated:
In this era of modern telecommunications, who could doubt the
powerful beneficial effect that mass media exposure can have
today on the candidacy of a significant aspirant seeking national
political office. The debates sponsored by the League were
broadcast on national television, watched by millions of
170. See Sidney Kraus, Televised Presidential Debates and Public
Policy 20 (2d ed. 2000) (“Young voters today have been raised with
television, and they expect to see presidential candidates perform at
least adequately on television.”).
171. Amato, supra note 6, at 224–25.
172. Id. at 224.
173. Jelen, supra note 8, at 4.
174. See Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 91–92 (noting Perot was
invited pursuant to the realistic chance standard).
175. Jeff Milchen, Presidential Debates is Really Duopoly by Design, SFGate
(Aug. 22, 2000, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum
/article/Presidential-Debate-Is-Really-Duopoly-by-Design-2709060.php.
176. Id.
177. See supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text.
178. 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989).
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Americans, and widely covered by the media. It is beyond
dispute that participation in these debates bestowed on the
candidates who appeared in them some competitive advantage
over their non-participating peers.179

When the D.C. Circuit quoted this passage from Buchanan v. Federal
Election Commission,180 the court described it as a “fundamental, and
rather obvious, point.”181 Such language clearly demonstrates a
judicial acknowledgement of the instrumentality debates serve to a
successful campaign in the modern political landscape.
b.

Availability of Less Restrictive Alternatives

The availability of less restrictive alternatives can also influence
the reasonableness analysis.182 For the presidential debates, there have
been a number of recommendations for less restrictive options for the
third criterion in selecting the participants. One suggestion is to
remove the third criterion altogether, leaving just the first two
requirements.183 This alone would significantly lower the field of
constitutionally eligible candidates because just getting on the ballot
involves an arduous petition process in most states.184 Since 1988, of
the roughly 200 individuals who run each year, the highest number of
third-party candidates to reach the ballot requirement in a single year
has only been five.185 However, if ballot eligibility became the strictest
179. Id. at 626.
180. 112 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000).
181. Id. at 65.
182. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 271 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“Another pertinent inquiry would explore the
availability of less restrictive alternatives.”).
183. See, e.g., Compl., Johnson v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates,
8:2012cv01600, at 6–7 (asking the court to limit the CPD’s eligibility
requirements to the first two); Raskin, supra note 113, at 1997–98
(calling for all constitutionally eligible candidates who meet the
balloting requirement to be allowed to participate in the debates, so
long as they are “serious” about their candidacy and not “lampooning”
the event). In fact, Raskin’s suggestion was even broader because it
called for there to always be a third party present at the debate. If no
third party met the requisite ballot total, then whichever candidate had
the third highest total number of ballots would be invited. Id. at 1997.
184. William J. Keefe & Marc J. Hetherington, Parties, Politics,
and Public Policy in America 50 (9th ed. 2003).
185. See The 15 Percent Barrier, Open Debates, http://opendebates.org/
theissue/15percent.html (“In 1988 only two third-party candidates, in
1992 only three third-party candidates, in 1996 only four third-party
candidates, in 2000 only five third-party candidates, in 2004 only four
third-party candidates, in 2008 only four third-party candidates, and in
2012 only two third-party candidates.”).
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requirement, that would become the full-time focus of all third-party
campaigns and might eventually result in an unmanageable amount of
qualified debaters.186
Another proposal is to drop the 15% requirement down to a 5%
show of support. This makes sense for a number of reasons. For one,
it is a compelling argument that if the ballot barrier were the highest
bar, then third-party campaigns would make that their primary
concern187 due to the bounty of advantages that accompany
participation.188 Secondly, one of the crucial benefits of third-party
inclusion is that they serve an important function of raising issues
that the two major candidates may otherwise ignore.189 But voter
support of third-party candidates typically only occurs where there is
substantial dissatisfaction with the major-party candidates;190 thus a
showing of some support would help reveal what issues are most
important to voters. Lastly, this percentage mirrors the threshold
requirement for minor parties to be eligible for federal campaign
funding.191 The D.C. Circuit has noted the logical sense it would make
to align these thresholds.192 As former New York Governor, Mario
Cuomo, reasoned, “[i]f you’re going to give them taxpayers’ money on
the theory that they’re credible candidates, then you ought to let
them participate.”193 One possible and interesting change to this
suggestion is to set an initial debate at a 5% threshold, which then
increases with each debate in a given election year.194
186. Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 95.
187. Id.
188. See discussion supra Part III.C.
189. Rosenstone, supra note 5, at 221.
190. Id. at 163.
191. See 11 C.F.R. § 9008.2(d) (defining “minor parties” as those who receive
“5 percent or more, but less than 25 percent” of the popular vote in an
election); § 9008.3(b) (entitling “minor parties” to payments with
respect to any presidential nominating convention).
192. See Buchanan v. FEC, 112 F. Supp. 2d 58, 74 (D.D.C. 2000) (“A
reasonable person could find it ironic that a candidate need win only 5%
of the popular vote to be eligible for federal funding, but must meet a
15% threshold to be eligible for the debates.”).
193. The 15 Percent Barrier, Open Debates, http://opendebates.org/the
issue/15percent.html.
194. See Farah, supra note 81, at 152 (describing a senator’s proposal that a
staging organization host a preliminary debate including any candidate
who was either on all fifty state ballots or showed a 5% level of support;
subsequent debates would then require a 10% threshold); Hull, supra
note 66, at 342–43 (noting that a polling threshold represents a good
compromise because it gives third-party candidates a legitimate chance
to participate and share their ideas while trimming the participants to
the more likely victors as the election nears).

268

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 1·2013
The Political Duopoly

Representative Jesse L. Jackson Jr. proposed another noteworthy
suggestion: in addition to the 5% barrier, a third party should be
included if a majority of those polled indicated they would like to see
that candidate participate. Jackson proposed the following resolution
to Congress:
Presidential candidate should be permitted to participate in
debates among candidates if—(1) at least 5 percent of
respondents in national public opinion polls of all eligible voters
support the candidate’s election for President; or (2) if a
majority of respondents in such polls support the candidate’s
participation in such debates.195

While Jackson’s proposal was not successful, it would have addressed
the issue that third-party exclusion from the debates is often at odds
with the preferences of the majority of voters.196
These examples of offered suggestions illustrate the variety of
selection criteria available to a staging organization. While they may
not be perfect, these alternatives are less restrictive than the 15%
requirement while still achieving the CPD’s legitimate justifications of
preventing a chaotic event. In light of all of these considerations, a
court could reasonably conclude that the CPD’s 15% requirement
meets the elements of a section 1 violation as an unreasonable
restraint on competitive activity.

IV. Why Courts Should Allow Antitrust Application
A court faced with a third-party suit against the CPD alleging
antitrust violations may understandably be unwilling to rule in the
plaintiff’s favor. The Supreme Court’s sweeping statements in direct
opposition to Sherman Act application in the political arena197 would
likely serve as a powerful deterrent, and with good reason. However,
there is a possible distinction between a third-party suit against the
CPD and this political activity exemption198 and, further, the Supreme

195. H.R. Con. Res. 373, 106th Cong. (2000).
196. The 15 Percent Barrier, Open Debates, http://opendebates.org/the
issue/15percent.html (noting that seventy-six percent of voters wanted
to see Perot debate in 1996 and that sixty-four percent of voters wanted
to see both Ralph Nader and Pat Buchanan included in the 2000
presidential debates).
197. E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 141
(1961) (“The proscriptions of the Act, tailored as they are for the
business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the political
arena.”).
198. See supra Part II.B (discussing a possible distinction to the NoerrPennington doctrine).
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Court is capable of changing its treatment of antitrust applicability in
certain arenas.199
But even if the court reaches the merits, there is neither direct
nor wholly analogous precedent to control the application.
Consequently, each of the possible third-party-candidate arguments
regarding the elements of a section 1 violation may be viewed as
somewhat strained.200 Nevertheless, a court could still rationally
conclude, after weighing the totality of circumstances, that the 15%
requirement constitutes a concerted action resulting in an
unreasonable restraint of competition affecting commerce. If a court
finds that it could rule in favor of a third-party candidate in an
antitrust suit against the CPD, it should rule accordingly due to the
number of public policy benefits that can stem from third-party
inclusion in the debates.
A.

Public Policy Benefits of Including Third-Party Candidates

The Supreme Court has long recognized the impact and
importance of debates in public policy. It has stated that there is a
“profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”201 The Court has
further recognized that debates have an “exceptional significance in
the electoral process”202 because they give voters the opportunity to
“intelligently evaluate the candidates’ personal qualities and their
positions on vital public issues” before making a decision.203
Additionally, political campaigns enjoy First Amendment protections
because they involve the “unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.”204 Third-party candidates are often the vehicle to energize
these desired political and social changes valued by the Court.
The CPD’s emphasis on only featuring candidates with a realistic
chance of winning205 devalues the contributions third-party candidates
can make without receiving a single vote. Third-party candidates
199. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the evolution of antitrust application
in professional sports).
200. See supra Part III.A–C
candidate arguments).

(discussing

these

possible

third-party

201. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
202. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 675 (1998).
203. Id. (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981)).
204. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (quoting Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
205. The 15% requirement was an attempt to quantify the realistic chance
standard. See Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 93 (discussing the
need to revise its selection criteria so that it was more concrete).
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serve two critical roles in American politics: (1) they bring issues to
the table that the major parties may otherwise ignore and (2) they
reflect and amplify citizen discontent with the major-party policies.206
Rationally, the major parties will react to these signs of voter
discontent.207 Third-party candidates have helped popularize several
groundbreaking ideas—such as the abolition of slavery, social security,
child labor laws, labor union formation, public schools, and public
power—before they were adopted by major parties.208 But while thirdparty candidates may bring different ideas to the forefront, the more
effective route to alter policy may be to target specific candidates
within the major parties who share the same values and are willing to
represent that point of view.209
Even if it is not the most effective method, that does not discredit
third-party candidates’ value as a vehicle for effectuating social
change. For example, in 1992 Ross Perot made the growing federal
budget deficit a main tenet of his campaign. Neither the Republicans
nor Democrats were eager to raise the issue because the deficit
ballooned during Republican presidencies and Democratic majorities
in the House of Representatives.210 Perot forced the issue at the
debates and was able to swiftly bring attention to the problem, which
increased public concern.211 However, the changes third-party
candidates help bring are not always positive. For example, in 1968,
the Nixon administration softened its stance on racial integration in
order to attract the supporters of American Independent Party
candidate George Wallace.212 Nevertheless, third-party candidates
serve as an important check on the major parties. Voters can use the
threat of exit to enforce accountability among elected officials.213
Thus, even if they are not elected, third-party candidates serve a
crucial role in the preservation of democracy.214
Third-party inclusion in the debates can result in a positive
impact on voter interest and turnout.215 Ross Perot’s inclusion in the
206. Rosenstone et al., supra note 5, at 221.
207. Id. at 222.
208. The 15 Percent Barrier, Open Debates, http://opendebates.org/the
issue/15percent.html.
209. See Keefe & Hetherington, supra note 184, at 51.
210. Id. at 53.
211. Id. at 53–54.
212. Rosenstone et al., supra note 5, at 111.
213. Id. at 222.
214. Id.
215. The debates themselves would also benefit by receiving less skepticism and
a boost of public confidence. See Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 100.
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1992 debates demonstrated this possibility. For one, he was able to
raise public consciousness about vital matters.216 Another indicator of
voter interest is the viewership of the debates, and the 1992 three-way
debates had over twice as many viewers as the Clinton-Dole debates
of 1996.217 Television ratings dropped with each Clinton-Dole debate,
while the 1992 debates drew progressively larger audiences.218 Finally,
Perot’s inclusion in the 1992 debates helped boost voter turnout.
Roughly twelve million more people voted than in the previous
presidential election.219
The American political system currently seems ripe for the
introduction of third-party candidates into the presidential debates.
Recently, a polling indicated that a record-high forty percent of
Americans identified themselves as independents.220 This percentage
was higher than the level of support shown for either of the two major
parties.221 Thus, voters may be more interested than ever to hear
alternative points of view. Besides, even if the third-party candidate
does not have a realistic chance of winning the presidency, voters may
still simply want to see them debate.222
B.
1.

Historical Support

Broader Purposes of the Sherman Act

Benefits to public policy should be influential in antitrust
litigation because “the Sherman Act embodies what is to be
characterized as an eminently ‘social’ purpose.”223 Senator John
216. Include Perot in Debates; Abolish Dysfunctional Debate Commission,
supra note 61. See also Keefe & Hetherington, supra note 184
(discussing Perot’s use of the debates to raise public awareness of the
federal budget deficit issue).
217. See Milchen, supra note 175.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Jeffrey M. Jones, Record-High 40% of Americans Identify as
Independents in ‘11, Gallup Politics (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.gallup.
com/poll/151943/record-high-americans-identify-independents.aspx.
221. See id. (polling indicated levels of support for Democrats and Republicans
at thirty-one percent and twenty-seven percent, respectively).
222. See, e.g., Include Perot in Debates; Abolish Dysfunctional Debate
Commission, supra note 61 (“Perot isn’t going to win the election. But
so what? He has a lot of interesting, informative things to say, and
ought to be heard . . . .”).
223. Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy 227 (1954).
See also Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust
Movement?, in The Paranoid Style in American Politics and
Other Essays 205 (1965) (“The political and social arguments against
monopoly were pressed with greater clarity than the economic argument
and with hardly less fervor.”).
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Sherman himself at times evinced the idea that one of the key
attributes of the Act was to free citizens of corruption and maintain
“freedom of independent thinking in political life.”224 Its cornerstone
principle rests on the philosophy of competition.225 This philosophy
reflects the deep-seated American value of establishing checks to
prevent the concentration of power.226 In addition to its economic
uses, there existed a “moral” objective of the Sherman Act, which
stood for a notion of fairness and that “newcomers be able to enter
the game . . . on reasonably open terms.”227 Thus, beyond the
economic purposes of the Act, there exist the broader purposes of fair
competition and checks on concentrated power. These goals would
appear to support an application of the Act to the CPD if a court
found that the staging organization helps insulate two entities from
competition.
For such a powerful law, the Sherman Act contains relatively
little and simple language. Section 1, in its entirety, is less than one
hundred words.228 One extensive review of the legislative intent of the
Act theorized that Congress was intentionally vague in order to allow
for greater judicial discretion.229 In light of this, a court could point to
some historical support if it decides to extend the doctrine for the
purposes of limiting exclusionary practices for public good.
224. Thorelli, supra note 223, at 227.
225. Id.; see also Peter R. Dickson and Philippa K. Wells, The Dubious Origins
of the Sherman Antitrust Act: The Mouse That Roared, 20 J. Pub. Pol’y
& Marketing 3, 3 (2001) (noting that the Sherman Act “enshrine[ed] the
principle that more competition is better than less competition”).
226. See Hofstadter, supra note 223, at 205 (“From the pre-Revolutionary
tracts through the Declaration of Independence and The Federalist to
the writings of the states’ rights advocates, and beyond the Civil War
into the era of antimonopoly writers and the Populists, there had been a
perennial quest for a way of dividing, diffusing, and checking power and
preventing its exercise by . . . a consolidated group of interests at a
single center.”).
227. Id. at 209.
228. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.”).
229. See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman
Act, 9 J.L. & Econ. 7, 48 (1966) (“Sherman and others clearly
believed that they were legislating a policy and delegating to the courts
the elaboration of subsidiary rules.”).
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2.

Evidence of an Evolving Doctrine: The Baseball Trilogy

Although the Supreme Court has previously frowned upon the
idea of applying antitrust law to the political arena,230 that does not
mean this will always be its impression. Antitrust law doctrine has
shown an ability to change over time, and this flexibility is well
evidenced by the evolution of baseball’s “antitrust exemption.” In
Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs231—the Court’s first opportunity to review the application of
antitrust law to sports—the Supreme Court ruled that this profession
did not constitute commerce for purposes of the Sherman Act.232
Although the lower courts may not have liked this result,233 the
Court—in follow-up case Toolson v. New York Yankees234—refused to
overturn Federal Baseball because the sport had developed a reliance
on the exemption.235
Despite its refusal to subject baseball to antitrust violations, the
Court eventually changed its stance that sports did not constitute
commerce under the Sherman Act. In the years following Federal
Baseball and Toolson, the Court ruled that professional boxing,236
football,237 and basketball238 leagues were all subject to antitrust
liability. In Flood v. Kuhn239—the final case of the “baseball trilogy”—
the Court, still refusing to remove baseball’s antitrust exemption,240
admitted this was an illogical conclusion supported only by stare

230. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Noerr-Pennington doctrine).
231. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
232. Id. at 208–09 (refusing to analyze baseball’s reserve clause after holding
that the fans’ personal effort to cross state lines to pay to watch the
exhibitions “is not a subject of commerce”).
233. Peter A. Carfagna, Sports and the Law: Examining the
Legal Evolution of America’s Three “Major Leagues” 56
(2d ed. 2011) (noting a statement by the Second Circuit that players
were regarded as “quasi-peons” (quoting Gardella v. Chandler,
172 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1949))).
234. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
235. See id. at 357 (“The business has thus been left for thirty years to
develop, on the understanding that it was not subject to existing
antitrust legislation.”).
236. United States v. Int’l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
237. Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
238. Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
239. 407 U.S. 258 (1971).
240. Id. at 283–84 (“Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed [Federal
Baseball and Toolson] to stand for so long . . . [that it] has clearly
evinced a desire not to disapprove of them legislatively.”).
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decisis that could only be remedied by the legislature.241 Nevertheless,
the Court firmly stated that “[p]rofessional baseball is a business and
it is engaged in interstate commerce,”242 thus coming full circle on its
initial determination. This willingness to adapt its analysis in different
times may somewhat relieve any third-party candidate discouraged by
the Courts initial reaction to antitrust application in the political
arena in Noerr-Pennington.
C.

Ease of Transition

A court should not hesitate to find the 15% requirement
unreasonable for fear of the unknown aftermath following its decision.
No chaos would ensue. The CPD would need to establish a new set of
“pre-established objective criteria” for its candidate selection in order
to comply with FECA.243 In doing so, it would be able to maintain its
first two requirements—that a client be constitutionally eligible and
be on a number of ballots that would make it mathematically possible
to win the Electoral College.244 These represent a candidate’s
theoretical chance of winning, and without them, the debates could be
open to countless participants.245 Such an overcrowded event would
likely render it impossible to “intelligently evaluate the candidates’
personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues,”246 thus
depriving the public of a key benefit of the debates. These first two
requirements are therefore reasonable because they allow a staging
organization to avoid this outcome.
Additional requirements could also be added to ensure the public
benefits from the debates. There are justifications to limit access to
the debates beyond the first two requirements because it is reasonable
to think that these alone would be insufficient to guarantee a
manageable number of participants.247 And as discussed earlier, there
are a number of available limitations that could meet these

241. Id. at 284 (“If there is any inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an
inconsistency and illogic of long standing that is to be remedied by the
Congress and not by this Court.”).
242. Id. at 282.
243. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.13(c) (2012) (“For all debates, staging
organization(s) must use pre-established objective criteria to determine
which candidates may participate in a debate.”).
244. See 2012 Criteria, supra note 7.
245. See Minow & LaMay, supra note 13, at 85–86 (noting concerns that
relaxed standards will lead to a chaotic event and risk losing the majorparty candidates).
246. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 53 (1976)).
247. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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justifications without being unduly restrictive.248 Therefore, if a court
rules that the current CPD requirements are unreasonable, a chaotic
event to the detriment of the public is not likely to follow. Instead, it
is reasonable to envision a better debate platform emerging as the
dust settles.

Conclusion
Unless the CPD voluntarily revises its selection criteria, thirdparty candidates are likely to continue their pursuit of the podium
through the court system each election season. The debates have
become essential to establishing a third-party candidate’s viability,
and without them, the candidates are unlikely to ever reach the
15% threshold requirement. This catch-22 leaves litigation as the most
feasible route for seeking inclusion, despite the third-party candidates’
historical lack of success using this tactic.
The Supreme Court’s sweeping statements in direct opposition to
antitrust application in the political arena249 would probably be very
influential in a court’s analysis. Furthermore, the Sherman Act is
universally known as an economic doctrine.250 These considerations
make a third-party victory under the theory seem unlikely.
Nevertheless, a plaintiff could make credible responses to both of
these issues. For one, the situations in Noerr-Pennington can be
distinguished. Those facts involved political activity in the form of
influencing official legislative action, while a third-party-inclusion suit
would deal with seeking to obtain a position. Further, the baseball
trilogy demonstrates the Court’s flexibility in broadening its antitrust
application.
If a court reaches the merits, it would need to find that the
CPD’s selection criteria have an effect on commerce, arise out of a
conspiracy between the Republican and Democratic National
Committees, and constitute an unreasonable restraint of competition.
Due in part to the candor of its founders, there is a compelling
argument that the CPD is, in essence, a bipartisan organization; and
due to the essential nature of the debates and the feasibility of
alternate criteria, there also exists a compelling argument that the
15% requirement is an unreasonable restraint. The most strained
argument is probably showing an effect on commerce. While no
argument is likely to win on its own, mentioning all those suggested
248. See supra Part III.C.2.b (providing examples of less restrictive alternatives).
249. See E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
141 (1961) (noting the application of the Sherman Act is “not at all
appropriate . . . in the political arena.”).
250. See id. (noting that the Sherman Act is “tailored . . . for the
business world”).
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in this Note—the effect on salaried position involved, the corporate
funding, and advertisements—could be persuasive to a court weighing
the totality of circumstances.
Also, there is evidence suggesting both a more expansive, social
purpose of the Sherman Act and that its simplistic language was
drafted to allow for more judicial discretion. Therefore, if a court finds
that it could plausibly apply antitrust law, it should do so in light of
the public policy benefits that stem from third-party inclusion.
Despite third-party candidates’ lack of success in the courts, some
opinions appeared reluctant to rule in favor of the CPD. Recall in
Buchanan, the court noted that the FEC’s decision to classify the
CPD as “nonpartisan” would unfortunately lead to “increased public
cynicism about the integrity of our electoral system” and recognized
the “good public policy” of allowing third-party candidates in the
debates.251 This language may suggest that a wind of change is around
the corner, and that a court is looking for the right moment to step
in. Antitrust application could prove to provide that opportunity.
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251. Buchanan v. FEC, 112 F. Supp. 2d 58, 73, 76 (D.D.C. 2000).
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